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1. Introduction. The increasing scale of cross-border commuting in 
Europe and its relevance for EU law 
 
Worker cross-border commuting has grown steadily in the European Union 
over the past twenty years. A survey conducted in 2006 and published in 2009 
revealed some 780 000 frontier workers (Nerb, Hitzelsberger, Woidich, Pommer, 
Hemmer e Heczko 2009). Given EU enlargements since that time, the number of 
frontier workers has conceivably risen. In 2014, the European Commission issued 
a memorandum on EU labour mobility, estimating approximately 1.1 million 
cross-border workers. Labour market flexibility, the impact of the economic crisis 
on worker mobility and the ever-closer integration of national markets are 
contributing to further boosting the phenomenon (European Commission 2014). 
Under EU law, ‘frontier worker’ means any individual pursuing an activity 
as an employed or self-employed person in a Member State but residing in 
another Member State to which he/she returns daily or at least once a week as a 
rule
1
. Cross-border workers represent a specific category of migrant workers: the 
latter reside in the State of employment, whereas the former work in a country 
other than their Member State of residence. 
In any event, in principle frontier workers must be accorded the safeguards 
and rights encompassed in Article 45 TFEU and in relevant EU secondary 
legislation concerning worker freedom of movement. In this context, two issues 
often arise with regard to the implications of cross-border commuting for the State 
of employment, namely the treatment of wages for tax purposes and eligibility for 
social benefits. While the former aspect lacks common EU rules and is usually left 
to bilateral agreements on double taxation
 2
, EU legislators and the CJEU have 
addressed the latter problem on several occasions, in relation to both frontier 
workers and their family members. 
In particular, cross-border workers’ individual prerogatives and expectations 
of a “completely equal footing”
3
 protected by EU law have often clashed with 
                                                          
1
 The definition is provided by Art. 1 let. f) of Regulation 883/2004 of 29 April 2004 of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the coordination of social security systems. 
2
 This aspect will not be considered in the present analysis. 
3
 CJEU, judgment of 2 February 1989, case 186/87, Cowan, par. 10. 
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national interests. In times of economic crisis and revived nationalism, 
individuals’ mobility is under pressure from growing mistrust, and foreign 
workers are increasingly perceived as invading national job markets. Moreover, it 
has been remarked that governance of the foreign workforce in many Member 
States is leading to skills and origin-based preferences, rather than enhancing 
workers’ mobility rights in the EU (Paul 2013). A fortiori, the rising scale of 
cross-border commuting is a convenient scapegoat for veiled protectionist 
reactions to the lack of job opportunities and to tight national budgetary 
constraints. As a result, frontier workers and their family members end up being 
the primary targets of indirect discriminatory measures that hinder the exercise of 
their rights of free movement
4
. 
In this context, the present contribution examines how the Court of Justice 
deals with the specific situation of cross-border commuters. To this end, the 
analysis considers whether their economic link with the State of employment 
allows them to obtain financial aid from that State, regardless of their choice of 
residence. From the opposite standpoint, the key question is whether the Member 
States of employment are entitled to refuse to grant social advantages to workers 
and their family members who reside elsewhere. In fact, recent practice shows a 
trend towards a watered-down approach to the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. This tendency takes the shape of integration requirements 
imposed on frontier workers as a condition for welfare support, measures that are 
usually reserved to inactive citizens with no economic connections to the host 
Member State. In practice, the intent is often to restrict eligibility for social 
advantages, so as to separate the cross-border commuter regime from the situation 
of ‘ordinary’ migrant workers. 
Firstly, the article briefly addresses case law on economically inactive 
citizens’ access to welfare benefits in the host Member State. Specific attention is 
devoted to integration conditionality measures imposed by host Member States. 
Secondly, the analysis considers whether Member States are entitled to follow a 
similar approach in relation to frontier workers, due to their dual link with the 
State of origin and the State of employment. Member States are increasingly 
resorting to the permissive role played by integration requirements, which act as a 
shield protecting national welfare systems from (allegedly) excessive burdens. It 
is therefore worth discussing the drivers and justifications underpinning this trend 
and the extent to which this narrow approach to the principle of non-
discrimination is accepted by the Court of Justice, if indeed it is.  
 
 
2. Economically inactive EU citizens and integration conditionality: an 
ever closer… access to welfare 
 
2.1. Economically inactive EU citizens and the genuine link test 
 
                                                          
4
 In principle, with very few exceptions, EU law makes no distinction between workers and their 
family members’ rights: CJEU, judgment of 30 April 1996, case C-308/93, Bestuur van de Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank; judgment of 5 February 2002, case C-255/99, Humer, pars. 51-53. 
3 
 
Social policy and the social integration of foreign nationals are competences 
reserved to the Member States. National authorities enjoy a significant margin of 
discretion
5
, while EU legislation only encourages coordination among national 
welfare systems as a means to neutralize potential obstacles to freedom of 
movement (Pennings 2012). In any event, when confronted with the rights 
ensuing from the pillars of the internal market, national measures must not 
conflict with the fundamental principles of European legal order
6
. 
Caught between the integrative function of the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality and the interests of the Member 
States, this elusive notion is used to restrict the scope of application of the 
individual rights stemming from the establishment of the internal market. Whilst 
integration requirements have several implications in other fields of EU and 
national law (Mancano 2016, Montaldo 2016), Member States often impose them 
as a mandatory condition for economically inactive EU citizens to benefit from 
national welfare systems. In these situations, in fact, the absence of an economic 
link between the individual and the host Member State - and the subsequent lack 
of contribution to the national welfare system - can be overcome only if a 
sufficiently close personal connection has been established and can be 
demonstrated (Amadeo 2011). 
From this point of view, on the one hand, the Court of Justice has 
acknowledged that Member States are required to show a certain degree of 
financial solidarity to foreign EU citizens and their family members
7
. On the 
other, “it is permissible” for national authorities to ensure that welfare support 
granted to foreigners “does not become an unreasonable burden” hampering 
overall levels of assistance
8
. Seeking to reconcile concerns regarding unbridled 
access to social benefits by those who do not contribute to economic welfare, the 
Court of Justice has developed a specific form of integration conditionality. In this 
approach, Member States can render the exportability and granting of welfare 
benefits conditional upon a tangible link with the State concerned. In practice, 
welfare benefits can be legitimately reserved to inactive EU citizens who are able 
to demonstrate they achieved a certain level of integration in the host society
9
. 
As a means of addressing fears of unbearable welfare tourism, the genuine 
link criterion influences eligibility for a social benefit and warrants exclusion for 
many potential recipients. Therefore, national measures making the granting of 
social advantages contingent upon the demonstration of a genuine and stable link 
with the Member State where financial aid is sought can cause indirect 
discriminations that negatively affects foreign citizens. The key questions then 
become: what is the content of the notion of integration, and what degree of 
connection with the host society has to be established? 
As long as the welfare benefit at issue is not governed by EU law, settled 
case law clarifies that Member States enjoy wide discretion in deciding which 
                                                          
5
 CJEU, judgment of 18 July 2007, case C-213/05, Geven, par. 27. 
6
 CJEU, judgment of 26 January 1999, case C-18/95, Terhoeven, par. 44. 
7
 CJEU, judgment of 20 September 2001, case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, par. 44. 
8
 CJEU, judgment of 15 March 2005, case C-209/03, Bidar, par. 56. 
9
 Bidar, par. 57. 
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criteria to use for such an assessment
10
. Nonetheless, discretion in matters of 
social policy may not undermine the rights granted to individuals by the primary 
provisions regarding their fundamental freedoms
11
. It has also been suggested 
that, in principle, even in the absence of an economic link with the host State, a 
sufficient level of integration is to be inherently presumed in the event of a legal 
residence (Azoulai 2010)
12
. Moreover, the Court of Justice has consistently held 
that the criteria identified to demonstrate a genuine link “must not be too 
exclusive in nature”. They must not unduly select elements that “are not 
representative of the real and effective degree of connection”, to the exclusion of 
all other relevant factors
13
. 
As a rule, duration and continuity of residence are considered prototypical 
and all-encompassing conditions for demonstrating one’s degree of integration, 
since they likely entail the establishment of stable personal links with the host 
society
14
. Close personal and family ties likewise contribute to the appearance of a 
lasting connection
15
, as well as the demonstration of genuine attempts to seek 
employment for a reasonable time
16
. On the contrary, obligations to have 
completed a certain number of years of study
17
 or to have obtained a diploma or 
professional qualification within the territory of a given State
18
 have been labelled 
as overly exclusive in nature. 
Therefore, the criteria on which the genuine link is based must be flexible 
enough to address the challenge of diversity and complexity, inherent to the fuzzy 
notion of personal integration (Papadopoulos 2011). What is more, integration 
conditionality can have indirect discriminatory effects, to the detriment of the 
citizens of other Member States and their family members. As potential 
opportunities for major deviations from EU citizens’ regime and internal market 
freedoms, the relevant national measures must pursue a legitimate objective in the 
public interest, and be scrutinized in light of their appropriateness and 
proportionality to it. Discriminatory measures can be justified only insofar as they 
adequately and necessarily meet such an objective, given the absence or non-
feasibility of alternative and less restrictive solutions (Nascimbene and Rossi Dal 
Pozzo 2012). 
                                                          
10
 CJEU, judgment of 26 October 2006, case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas, par. 36; 1 October 
2009, case C-103/08, Gottwald, par. 34. 
11
 CJEU, judgment of 11 January 2007, case C-208/05, ITC, par. 40. In relation to frontier 
workers, see Court of Justice, judgment of 13 December 2012, case C-379/11, Caves Krier, par. 
52. 
12
 In relation to long-term residents who are third-country nationals: CJEU, judgment of 22 April 
2012, case C-571/10, Kamberaj, par. 90-92. 
13
 CJEU, judgment of 11 July 2002, case C-224/98, D’Hoop, par. 39; judgment of 21 July 2011, 
case C-503/09, Stewart, par. 95; judgment of 18 July 2013, joined cases C-523/11 and C-585/11, 
Prinz, par. 37. 
14
 CJEU, judgment of 18 November 2008, case C-158/07, Förster. 
15
 CJEU, judgment of 22 September 1988, case 236/87, Bergmann, par. 20-22; Court of Justice, 
Stewart, par. 100. 
16
 CJEU, judgment of 19 December 2013, case C-138/02, Collins, par. 69-70. 
17
 CJEU, judgment of 17 January 2013, case C-367/11, Prete, par. 50-51. 
18
 D’Hoop, par. 39. 
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From this point of view, a clear division of competences between the Court 
of Justice and national judges can be identified in light of the specific features of 
the preliminary reference procedure under Art. 267 TFEU. The former follows a 
principled way of reasoning: it is entitled to state whether a given criterion 
provided by national law adequately reflects the citizen’s degree of integration 
and is appropriate and proportionate to the objective pursued. It is instead up to 
the national court to establish whether a real link with the host society actually 
exists
19
, in view of the specific circumstances of each case and of the Luxembourg 
Court’s interpretative trajectories. 
The complementarity of the Court of Justice’s interpretative guidance and of 
the material application of EU law by national judges is of major importance, due 
to recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice on economically 
inactive individuals, job seekers, EU citizenship rights and the principle of non-
discrimination. 
 
2.2. From the genuine link to the residence test: An additional substantive 
condition for granting welfare benefits 
 
After a couple of decades of “vast jurisprudential endeavour”
20
 aimed at 
strengthening this “fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”
21
, 
European citizenship is now facing a reverse “reactionary phase” (Spaventa 2016; 
Belavusau and Kochenov 2016). The Court of Justice is being roundly and 
harshly criticized for having taken a restrictive stance (Giubboni 2015), 
sacrificing “the last vestiges of EU citizenship to the altar of [...] nativist 
tendencies” (O’Brien 2017). 
Building on its case law on residence conditions as a means to identify 
potential recipients of welfare benefits, in Brey the Court confirmed that the 
granting of financial aid could be legitimately subjected to the fulfilment of the 
requirements for obtaining a right to residence
22
. In that context, the scope of the 
right-to-reside test was limited to economically inactive citizens claiming social 
assistance. Its precise purpose was then to avoid excessive burdens on the social 
assistance system of the host State
23
. However, more recently, in Commission v. 
United Kingdom
24
, the Luxembourg Court broadened the scope of this test and 
accepted its extension to any social security advantage. Moreover, it described 
this check as a “substantive condition which economically inactive citizens must 
meet in order to be eligible” for social benefits
25
. 
                                                          
19
 CJEU, judgment of 4 June 2009, joined cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and 
Koupatantze, par. 41, in relation to the link with the national market; Prete, par. 42, with regard to 
personal connections in the absence of economic links. 
20
 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar of 4 February 2016, case C-165/14, Rendón Marin, par. 
110. 
21
 Grczelczyk, par. 31. 
22
 CJEU, judgment of 19 September 2013, case C-140/12, Brey, par. 44. 
23
 Brey, par. 30. 
24
 CJEU, judgment of 14 June 2016, case C-308/14, Commission v. United Kingdom. 
25
 Commission v. United Kingdom, par. 72. 
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This means that the right-to-reside test amounts to automatically excluding 
anyone who fails to fulfil it from social advantages in the host State. The Court 
disposes of any assessment of the other elements demonstrating the degree of 
personal and social integration. Irrespective of any consideration of 
proportionality, the presumption of a sufficient and genuine link in the event of 




The Court has invoked the same arguments in relation to other specific 
cases of economically inactive citizens. In Dano
27
, it deemed an individualized 
assessment of proportionality unnecessary in the case of claimants exercising their 
freedom of movement solely to obtain social benefits (Thym 2015). In Alimanovic 
and Garcia Nieto
28
, concerning the job seekers’ regime, the Court of Justice stated 
that the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC on the retention of the status of 
worker provide a sufficiently gradual system capable of taking into account 
individual circumstances. Job seekers “know, without ambiguity, what their rights 
and duties are”, so that an adequate level of legal certainty and transparency on 
the award of social assistance is guaranteed
29
. Therefore, no individual assessment 
is needed, since a normative exclusionary precondition is not fulfilled. 
This approach raises at least two major concerns. Firstly, in substance, it 
applies uniformly to a “patchwork” of individual statuses that do not share the 
same specific features (O’Brien 2013). What is more, it inflates rigidity in a 
complex system where flexible job markets, non-standard forms of employment 
and undeclared illegal work often lead to a misalignment between the EU notion 
of worker and the national attitude towards the label of inactive citizen (O’Brien, 
Spaventa and De Conink 2015). The lack of a case-by-case proportionality 
assessment could likewise be detrimental to people with reduced work capacity 
due to duty of care, disability, language or cultural barriers. 
Secondly, the right-to-reside test “occurs a stage before” that of the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality
30
. In Commission v. 
United Kingdom, the Advocate General submitted that a certain degree of 
discrimination is an inherent and almost inevitable feature of the freedom of 
movement
31
. Nonetheless, the exclusionary effects of the right-to-reside test 
neutralize any considerations on the actual degree of integration of the person 
concerned. European citizenship no longer triggers the principle of equality with a 
few proportionality-based exceptions. Instead, citizenship rights - and access to 
welfare benefits in particular - are restricted by a de facto automatic mechanism, 
to the exclusion of all other elements representing one’s degree of integration. 
                                                          
26
 The Court did not answer to the Commission’s complaint concerning the disproportionate nature 
of the residence test provided by the national legislation. 
27
 CJEU, judgment of 11 November 2014, case C-333/13, Dano. 
28
 CJEU, judgment of 15 September 2015, case C-67/14, Alimanovic; judgment of 26 February 
2016, case C-299/14, Garcia Nieto. 
29
 Alimanovic, par. 60. 
30
 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón of 6 October 2015, case C-308/14, Commission v. 
United Kingdom, par. 77. 
31
 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Commission v. United Kingdom, par. 75-76. 
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This increasingly substantial body of case law deconstructs some of the key 
advances of the integrative implications stemming from EU citizenship. Beyond 
legal arguments, some authors note the Court’s attempt to be a political actor 
facing the turbulence of the economic crisis (Kochenov 2013 and O’Brien 2017). 
The permissive effects of the genuine link and the even stricter exclusionary 
implications of the right-to-reside test are powerful tools in the hands of the EU 
judiciary and the national authorities to accommodate Member States and their 
interests (Palladino 2016). 
It is therefore worth considering whether, under the pressure of budgetary 
constraints and public narratives, this jurisprudential tendency is liable to affect 
economically active EU citizens as well. In this regard, the category of frontier 
worker appears to be on the front line, due to the aforementioned twofold link 
with the State of employment and the State of residence. On the one hand, these 
workers have an economic link with the State where they work and contribute to 
its welfare system accordingly. On the other, integration requirements do not fit 
their situation at all: they pay residence-related taxes in the State of origin, where 




3. The genuine link test, frontier workers and their family members 
 
Regardless of their specific situation, frontier workers have traditionally 
shared the same status as “ordinary” migrant workers under EU law. As long as 
they pursue a genuine and real activity for remuneration under the direction of 
another person, they fall under the broad notion of worker under Art. 45 TFEU, as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice
32
. Settled case law consistently remarks that 
EU citizens who, regardless of their place of residence and their nationality, are 
employed in another Member State fall within the scope of the Treaty provisions 
on the free movement of workers
33
. 
Therefore, cross-border commuters are entitled to demand non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality and the other prerogatives accorded 
pursuant to primary law to workers who exercise or have exercised the freedom of 
movement
34
. Likewise, they are covered by equal treatment provisions enshrined 
                                                          
32
 Inter alia, CJEU, judgment of 19 March 1964, case 75/63, Unger; judgment of 3 July 1986, case 
66/85, Lawrie-Blum, par. 16 and 17. It should be remarked that “there is no single definition of 
worker in [EU] law: it varies according to the area in which the definition is to be applied”. CJEU, 
judgment of 12 May 1998, case C-86/96, Martinez Sala, par. 31. However, the various 
implications of this notion do not affect the definition of frontier workers for the purposes of the 
present analysis.  
33
 CJEU, judgment of 12 December 2002, case C-385/00, de Groot, par. 76; judgment of 21 
February 2006, case C-152/03, Ritter-Coulais, par. 31. 
34
 All Treaty provisions relating to free movement of persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit 
by EU nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Union. They preclude 
measures that might place EU citizens at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic 
activity in the territory of another State. CJEU, judgment of 7 July 1992, case 370/90, Singh, par. 
16; judgment of 4 March 2004, case C-290/01, Schilling and Fleck-Schilling, par. 23. 
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in the relevant secondary legislation, such as Regulation (EU) 492/2011 and 
Directive 2014/54/EU on the freedom of movement of workers and Regulation 
(EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of national social security systems
35
. 
In line with this approach, while barring discrimination from the national 
work force, Regulation 492/2011 makes no distinction between migrant and 
cross-border worker. In fact, recital 5 thereof clarifies that freedom of movement 
must be enjoyed “without discrimination by permanent, seasonal and frontier 
workers”. Moreover, Art. 7 of the Regulation codifies the principle of equal 
treatment of any worker, in respect of any conditions of employment and work, 
including vocational training and social and tax advantages. From this point of 
view, it is deemed a specific expression, in the field of the granting of such 
advantages, of Art. 45, par. 2, TFEU
36
. Art. 7 replaces and reiterates without 
amendments the wording of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68, which was considered to 
benefit equally the different categories of individuals at issue
37
. 
Initially, mindful of this provision, the CJEU consistently held that 
economically active EU citizens exercising their freedom of movement should be 
automatically accorded access to welfare benefits in the host State
38
. Therefore, 
the recipients of a benefit should not be required to reside within the territory of 
the State of employment
39
. The Court also prevented the States from making the 




This stance marked a clear dividing line between economically active and 
inactive citizens, since the genuine link test applied only to the latter. The direct 
implication of the requirement of integration was a differentiated attitude towards 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. On the one hand, workers benefited 
from full equality of treatment with nationals in the Member State of employment. 
On the other, inactive citizens faced “a more nuanced approach to equality” 
(O’Brien 2008), subjected to a qualitative assessment of their personal situation, 
for instance in terms of length of stay, previous working experiences and personal 
links in the host State. Consequently, Member States could more easily justify 
indirectly discriminatory measures affecting inactive EU citizens aimed at 
pursuing legitimate objectives in the public interest. 
                                                          
35
 Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 2011 on the 
free movement for workers within the European Union; Directive 2014/54/EU of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise of rights 
conferred on workers in the context of the freedom of movement for workers.  
36
 CJEU, judgment of 11 September 2007, case C-287/05, Hendrix, par. 53; judgment of 20 
January 2013, case C-20/12, Giersch, par. 35. 
37
 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 July 2007, case C-212/05, Hartmann, par. 24; Geven, par. 15. 
38
 The concept of social advantage covers all advantages that, whether or not linked to a contract 
of employment, are generally granted to national workers “primarily because of their objective 
status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their ordinary residence on the national territory, 
and the extension of which to migrant workers therefore seems likely to facilitate their mobility 
within the Community”. Martinez Sala, par. 25. 
39
 CJEU, judgment of 27 November 1997, case C-57/96, Meints, par. 51; judgment of 8 June 1999, 
case C-337/97, Meeusen, par. 21. 
40
 CJEU, judgment of 9 July 1987, case 256/86, Frascogna, par. 25; judgment of 21 June 1998, 
case 39/86, Lair, par. 42. 
9 
 
However, in Hartmann and in Geven, the Court of Justice upheld a major 
reversal of its case law and extended the genuine link criterion to frontier workers 
(O’Leary 2008). According to the Court, the specific situation of cross-border 
commuters allows the Member State of employment to verify whether an 
adequately close attachment to its territory exists. The lack of a “sufficiently 
substantial occupation” in the State of employment amounts to justifying a refusal 
to grant a social advantage
41
. Therefore, the Court accepted that indirectly 
discriminatory legislation restricting the scope of Art. 7 of the Regulation in 
relation to frontier workers could be objectively justified and proportionate to a 
legitimate objective pursued by a State
42
. 
The revirement de jurisprudence was later confirmed in Commission v. 
Netherlands
43
, where the Court underlined that economically active citizens’ 
access to social advantages can be conditioned on the demonstration of a genuine 
link with the State concerned. Nonetheless, it tried to scale down its impact by 
urging a restrictive interpretation of the integration test. 
According to the Court, residence requirements are in principle 
inappropriate to demonstrate the (frontier) worker’s sufficient degree of 
integration. Participation in the employment market per se establishes close 
connections to the State of employment. What is more, as further underlined in 
subsequent case law
44
, through the taxes the (cross-border) worker pays by virtue 
of his economic activity, he contributes to the State of employment’s social 
policies and general welfare. Therefore, the Court envisaged a strong presumption 
of integration centred on a change of paradigm from mobility within the internal 
market to the economic effects of stability after the exercise of the freedom of 
movement (O’Leary 2014; Barbou des Places 2016). Like any departure from a 
general principle of EU law, this presumption should be rebutted only in 
exceptional circumstances, in light of the specific features of each case
45
. 
However, the case law on the subject is far from settled and the Court 
recently watered down its own statements. In Giersch, where access to a study 
grant for a frontier worker’s daughter was at stake, the Court rejected the 
presumption of equivalent integration of migrant workers and cross-border 
commuters. In particular, it contended that access to financial aid could be 
subjected to the condition of a minimum period of five years of work in 
Luxembourg, the State of employment
46
. This threshold was considered an 
appropriate demonstration of the frontier worker’s actual attachment to the labour 
market of that State and to its society as a whole. A contrario, a shorter period 
would not have fulfilled the integration requirement imposed by national 
legislation. 
                                                          
41
 Hartmann, par. 36; Geven, par. 26. 
42
 Hendrix, par. 54 and 55, with regard to a residence condition. 
43
 CJEU, judgment of 14 June 2012, case C-542/09, Commission v. Netherlands. 
44
 Commission v. Netherlands, par. 66. In Caves Krier, at par. 53, the Court underlined that the 
worker’s contribution to the social policies of the State of employment is essential to demonstrate 
his sufficient degree of integration, regardless of his personal situation. 
45
 The Court has confirmed this approach with regard to job seekers: Caves Krier, par. 55. 
46
 Giersch, par. 78-80. 
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The reversed presumption modelled by the Court represented a clear 
departure from a fully-fledged application of the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality to frontier workers and their family members. 
Admittedly, it was (also) meant to address the risk - whether real or perceived - of 
study grant forum shopping referred to by the State concerned and by several 
other Member States submitting written observations
47
. Indeed, the Luxembourg 
government took advantage of the condition of a significant period of occupation 
suggested by the Court to amend its relevant national law accordingly, thereby 
restricting access to study grants. 
Recently, the revised legislation has been fundamentally endorsed by the 
Court of Justice in Bragança Linares Verruga
48
, confirming the possibility to 
make receipt of financial aid for study purposes conditional on a parent having 
worked for at least five years in the State where the benefit is claimed. However, 
it clarified that this period must not necessarily be continuous, “inasmuch as short 
breaks are not liable to sever the connection” between the recipient and the 
Member State concerned
49
. Proportionality comes in the back door and, at least, 
prevents the blind application of the chronological integration requirement. 
At the present stage, in conclusion, the economic connection to the State of 
employment no longer automatically allows a frontier worker to receive support 
from that State. National authorities are entitled to make a case-by-case 
assessment in order to verify the fulfilment of the genuine link requirement. To 
perform this task, the national court needs to scrutinize the degree of economic 
integration in light of elements such as the features of the activity pursued, the 
duration and continuity of the occupational period, and the worker’s actual 
contribution to the financing of the State of employment. 
Hence, the genuine link test applied to frontier workers plays a permissive 
function in favour of the interests of the Member States (Neframi 2014). It 
endows the national authorities with a significant margin of discretionary choice 
as to the openness of their social policies and the selectivity of their welfare 
systems. The current trend confirms a less ambitious reading of the principle of 
non-discrimination. As such, it shapes the frontier worker regime after the 
economically inactive citizen paradigm, under which the achievement of a high 




4. Concluding remarks: Towards a watered down approach to the 
principle of non-discrimination? 
 
                                                          
47
 Giersch, par. 80, where the Court acknowledges the need to avoid tourism of social benefits. 
48
 CJEU, judgment of 14 December 2016, case C-238/15, Bragança Linares Verruga. 
49
 Bragança Linares Verruga, par. 69. A student’s parents had been working in Luxembourg for 
eight years separated by a few short breaks to seek new employment opportunities. In such 
situations, national legislation must be flexible enough to allow the national authority to consider 
the applicant’s overall personal condition. 
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The evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice concerning the frontier 
worker regime is at odds with the traditional approach to migrant workers, and 
marks a restrictive view of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. The strict stance taken by the Court in relation to EU citizens’ rights 
de facto ultimately impacts the weaker categories of migrant workers, namely job 
seekers - even in case of former employment periods - and cross-border 
commuters. 
Of course, frontier workers cannot be expected to fulfil a residence 
requirement. However, the rationale underpinning this criterion strikes back via 
the assessment of the duration and continuity of the employment period and of the 
nature of the economic activity pursued. Therefore, economically inactive citizens 
and frontier workers share a revived quantitative approach to the assessment of 
their personal situation. Quantity can imply the quality of one’s degree of 
integration, though this is not an automatic equation. Moreover, the Court seems 
tempted to abandon the dynamic, extensive and all-encompassing reading of the 
freedom of movement of workers. The notion of worker for the purposes of 
Regulation 492/2011 is uniform and all migrant workers formally share the same 
regime. However, different degrees of exercise of the freedom of movement 
accordingly trigger a variety of interpretative solutions. 
To uphold this variable geometry of social benefits, it has been pointed out 
that employment-related benefits do not exclude residence-based benefits as a 
legitimate expression of territorially organised solidarity, acknowledged by 
Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 492/2011. In addition to having social and 
employment ties, residents are taxable in the concerned State and therefore 
contribute fully to financial welfare. 
At first glance, this argument was at the basis of the Court’s ruling in 
Geven, were access to the child allowance in Germany was limited to residents, to 
the detriment of frontier workers. However, in practice, the Court acknowledged 
that German authorities usually took into consideration additional factors and that 
the ultimate purpose of the national law was to grant the benefit to persons with a 
sufficient relationship with the host State, regardless of residence. A closer look at 
the Court’s recent judgments reveals that the social advantages that frontier 
workers and their family members were seeking were not per se related to a stable 
residence connection. Instead, the justifications raised by national governments 
and the way that they have been addressed by the Court lead one to consider that 
the drivers of the restrictive trend under consideration are based mainly on 
national budgetary concerns. 
When a Member State derogates from freedom of movement, it bears the 
burden of proof as to the legitimate objective it pursues in the public interest and 
the appropriateness, proportionality and necessity of the measures taken. Two 
elements consistently arise in Luxembourg case law. From a substantive point of 
view, departures from general principles of EU legal order cannot be justified 
solely on grounds of alleged budgetary concerns
50
 or vague and undefined social 
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 CJEU, judgment of 20 March 2003, case C-187/00, Kutz-Bauer, par. 59; judgment of 10 March 





. From a procedural perspective, the analysis of appropriateness and 
proportionality should be accompanied by “specific evidence substantiating [the 
State’s] arguments”
52
. The Court also added that “such an objective, detailed 
analysis, supported by figures, must be capable of demonstrating, with solid and 
consistent data, that there are genuine risks” to the interest invoked
53
. 
Therefore, the burden of proof by which the national authorities are bound is 
particularly stringent. Some scholars have pointed out that such a standard of 
evidence might even undermine Member States’ reliance on public interest 
justifications
 
(Nic Shuibhne and Maci 2013). In any event, what matters is that, in 
principle, generalizations do not justify an indirectlydiscriminatory national 
measure. 
Nonetheless, recent case law on frontier workers’ access to social benefits 
widens the mesh of the net of judicial scrutiny of national governments’ 
justifications. For instance, in Giersch and Linares Verruga, the Court accepts that 
a study grant should be reserved to frontier workers’ children who will likely 
return to the Member State having financed their studies. According to the Court, 
the closer the link with such a State, the higher the probability that the student will 
contribute to that State’s development, thus repaying the financial aid received. 
The standard of proof is significantly undemanding. The Court is satisfied with 
general assumptions on the national educational policy. The Luxembourg 
government aims at increasing the proportion of residents with a higher education 
degree, while avoiding excessive financial burdens deriving from the high rate of 
frontier workers employed in Luxembourg
54
. 
Although the evolution of the case law on the subject is still magmatic, this 
is another critical feature of the shaping of the cross-border workers’ regime. It 
marks another departure from the traditional rationale of free movement of 
workers that should be considered in view of the development of the internal 
market as a whole, rather than from the attainment of national economic goals. 
The Court itself had clarified elsewhere that the acquisition of a qualification or a 




The (at least) less ambitious narrative of the principle of non-discrimination 
developed through the extension of the genuine link test and a more generous 
attitude towards Member States’ objective justifications place frontier workers on 
                                                                                                                                                               
considerations may underlie more demanding national policy choices, in terms of healthcare 
service organization, social policy and environmental policy. 
51
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intended to preserve public health. 
54
 Luxembourg has the largest proportion of frontier workers in the EU. They have been 
continuously increasing since the 1970s, and were more than 170 000 in 2015, representing about 




 Prete, par. 45. 
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the front lines with respect to the practical and legal challenges implied by the free 
movement of workers. This is further exacerbated by the lack of coherence 
between the different legal systems of Member States and within the EU legal 
order itself. Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems assigns exclusive applicable legislation in the event of overlapping 
benefits or advantages. As such, it pre-determines the division of competences 
between the State of residence and the State of employment, depending on the 
nature of the grant at stake and the criteria identified by the European legislator
56
. 
On the contrary, Regulation (EU) 492/2011 does not prescribe similar rules of 
coordination. It follows that no protection is afforded to frontier workers who are 
not eligible for certain benefits in both Member States. Therefore, a restrictive 
approach to eligibility for social benefits within the Member State of employment 
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